This article measures the impact of Fiscalía Nacional Económica (FNE), the agency responsible for enforcing competition law, on the outcome of antitrust trials in Chile. Using statistics on lawsuits since the inception of the new Competition Tribunal in 2004, we find that involvement of the public agency increases the probability of obtaining a guilty verdict in an antitrust lawsuit by 40 percentage points. Conditional to a verdict, prosecutor participation raises the likelihood of a conviction by 38 percentage points. The results are robust to possible selection bias by the public agency. The prosecutor is likely to take part in cases involving sensitive markets and in accusations of collusion. The state-related character of the accused entity, in addition to its size, does not affect the probability of agency intervention.
percent probability of conviction for lawsuits filed by the FNE. The results obtained are not attributable to the selection bias of cases on the part of the FNE. By using instrumental variables to control for self-selection, the probability of an FNE-involved conviction is even more greatly increased Our results support the hypothesis of the superiority of public enforcement over private enforcement. According to the explanations provided by the theory, public enforcement's higher probability of conviction may reside in the superior expertise of the public agency concerning the application of competition principles. This would allow the prosecutor to better defend its cases before the Tribunal. Another possible reason, as we will explain below, is the strategic use of the lawsuits by firms. However, with the available information, it is not possible to determine the prevailing cause behind public action's greater effectiveness.
Regarding those factors that influence the FNE's participation in a case, data show that the prosecutor is most likely to initiate legal actions when the accusation concerns collusion, the affected market is considered "sensitive," or the accused party is not listed on the Chilean stock exchange. This last variable can be considered a proxy for the size of the accused company. The state-related nature of the accused party-state-owned company, public agency, ministry, or municipality-does not influence the FNE's decision of becoming party to a case. As such, we can rule out a capture bias that inhibits the public agency from acting against other entities that are also state-related. These results point toward the strengthening of the public prosecution as the most effective mean to achieve the objective of protecting competition in the markets.
The article is structured in the following manner. Part II reviews the literature comparing public and private enforcement in antitrust law. Its emphasis is placed on summarizing the different theories that explain the relative advantages of one type of enforcement over the other. Part III describes the competition system in Chile in relation to the legal procedure for lawsuits. Part IV describes the data and provides an analysis of factors influencing the probability of the prosecutor's involvement in a case. Part V considers the impact of the FNE's participation in a case on the likelihood that the accused company will be declared guilty. Part VI concludes.
II. THEORIES ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
According to the literature, the first difference between public and private enforcement is motive. 1 A company will not only file a lawsuit to halt anticompetitive behavior, but also to obtain damages for the harm suffered. Meanwhile, a public agency will act when it considers that the case constitutes a sufficiently grave violation to competition law. The objectives of private benefit and social welfare, sought respectively by each party, are not always congruent. The differences between them are in both nature and intensity. In this respect, the possibility of obtaining compensation greater than the damage suffered, as in the case of treble damages in the United States, is a powerful mechanism for encouraging private enforcement in competition. 2 The divergence between the objectives of both types of enforcement is manifest if we focus on the dissuasive purpose of the sanctions. A company that has been victim of an anticompetitive action and whose losses are irrecoverable would wish to enter into proceedings only if it could obtain compensation for the harm suffered. On the other hand, a public agency will pursue the case given the demonstrative effect of the sanction on anticompetitive actions, and its future dissuasive impact. As pointed out by Ilya Segal and Michael Whinston, public enforcement, by focusing more on dissuasion, is forward-looking and, therefore, has a greater commitment to initiate proceedings, including in those cases where competitive damage is irreversible. 3 It is noteworthy that companies may also wish to act as forward-looking by building a reputation of being aggressive toward anticompetitive acts. Notwithstanding, it is likely for the reputation effect to be stronger for public agencies than for private companies. To dissuade similar practices in all industries is part of the objective function of the public agency, whereas a company will focus solely on itself.
Information is another relevant dimension in this comparison. Broadly speaking, information is knowledge about the occurrence of anticompetitive actions, evidence to support the case, and the technique required to assess whether the actions were anticompetitive. The literature recognizes that companies, as players in the market, are better equipped to detect the anticompetitive practices that affect them. A public agency, that by default supervises all industries, cannot match the ability of a firm to identify the competition offenses and should, in most of cases, use firm's complaints as a way to identify potential problems.
On the other hand, public agencies are better equipped to discern whether or not an action is harmful to competition. The assessment of an antitrust violation requires the application of complex economic and legal concepts. According to Segal and Whinston, that knowledge, which is more scientific than factual, may be better addressed by specialized agencies than private companies. 4 The specific knowledge will be more relevant to practices subject to the rule of reason than those actions that are illegal per se. Besides the circumstances of the case, we must assess whether the reported action is harmful to competition, while in per se prohibitions only evidence specific to that particular case is needed.
The informational advantage that a firm may have does not imply that public agencies do not have their own investigation capacity. The parties involved in a dispute often omit information pertinent to the case. In an investigation of collusion, material evidence on the agreement between competing firms is required. Leniency programs are one way to induce involved firms to reveal information. However, for many collusion cases, the evidence is obtained by inspections performed by public agencies.
One of the main risks of private enforcement is the strategic use of lawsuits by a firm. The objectives behind the strategic use of law may vary. The firm can pursue litigation to exclude, extract rents, or induce collaborative behavior from competitors. 5 The abuse of litigation as a strategic tool is possible because trials are expensive and courts may err in favor of the litigating company.
For a defendant, the cost of going to a trial involves not only legal fees, but also potential damage to the firm's reputation. For instance, a firm that is in process of merging and requires the approval of the authorities will not want also to be involved in a pending antitrust trial. Notice that damage multipliers may exacerbate the strategic use of antitrust law. Although damage amplification is useful to deter anticompetitive conduct, it also encourages the abusive use of antitrust trials.
Preston McAfee, Hugo Mialon, and Sue Mialon develop a model that compares the two types of enforcement. They exploit the inherent private enforcement trade-off between better anticompetitive action data and the strategic use of antitrust law. 6 The authors find that if the 2004) . The authors identify seven potential strategic uses of antitrust laws. These are: (1) obtain rents from a successful rival; (2) change the terms of a contract; (3) punish uncooperative behavior; (4) respond to an existing demand; (5) avoid a hostile takeover; (6) prevent the entry of a rival; and (7) courts resolve disputes with a low level of error, only legitimate suits will be submitted and the conjunction of private and public enforcement will provide the superior solution. However, if the courts are less accurate, private litigation will only add value if the cost of public enforcement is sufficiently high. The superiority of public over private enforcement may not be valid due to budget constraints and agency problems. Public agencies usually have limited resources to accomplish their enforcement tasks. Litigation is costly as it involves trained staff and potential external studies or consultants. Thus, it is not always possible to prosecute all valid cases.
The agency problem is defined as the divergence between the action undertaken by the public agency and its legal objectives. 7 The incongruity between mission and action is caused by information asymmetry between the public agency and the entities that should monitor its function. This may lead the agency to align its goals with those of the regulated industry or with enforcement agency stakeholders. This phenomenon is known as regulatory capture, which is an inherent feebleness of agencies in charge of supervising industries.
Regulatory capture can be displayed in different ways. The agency may simply not prosecute certain cases or undertake actions in cases with no competitive risk. Depending on the type of anticompetitive offense, private action can offset both types of biases induced by the nonbenevolent behavior of the agency. We must mention that is less likely to capture an antitrust agency than an agency that regulates a specific industry.
Recall that one explanation of the capture is the phenomenon of the revolving door. 8 Given their generalist nature, by default antitrust agencies oversee all markets, and therefore the future employment opportunities of its top officials are not tied to a particular industry.
Agency problems are also manifested by the distortions introduced into the authorities' decisions regarding the allocation of resources among the institution's various tasks. As noted by Jean Tirole, bureaucracies generally measure their own performance poorly due to their functions and the absence of benchmarks. Thus, when choosing particular cases, the agency may prefer to choose those that are easier to win rather than focus on cases that are more harmful. By this biased selection of cases, authorities are able to signal their ability to litigate to those who assess their performance or to the overall industry. Another possible bias is that the agency pursues cases that have a greater public impact in terms of the nature of the involved market or the magnitude of affected consumers, regardless of the merits of the case itself.
The relative advantage of the public enforcement may also depend on the type of competitive offense analyzed. Anticompetitive acts that hurt multiple entities-firms or individuals-create externalities in the legal action taken by plaintiffs, which in turn may result in sub-optimal level of private enforcement. In a lawsuit for abuse of dominant position where the victim is a single company, private enforcement should be enough. The victim gets most of the benefit of the effort exerted in court, either to stop the illegal action timely or to obtain compensation.
The opposite case, with strong externalities in enforcement, is collusion among firms that operate in the retail market. The victims are customers whose individual perceived harm is low, but whose damages at the aggregate level can be significant. Here, each affected individual will have no incentive to sue in order to obtain compensation; however, from a global point of view, it would be desirable to initiate legal actions. Public enforcement would then operate as a public good, benefiting all those affected by the collusion. Externalities between parties, resulting in sub-optimal private enforcement, also occur in cases of abuse of a dominant position, where the victims are more than one company. The free-riding problem is further exacerbated if the harmed firms are small businesses that do not have the funds to meet the costs of a lawsuit against a large company.
Private action will not be enough when the victims, fearing reprisals, are unwilling to publicly accuse a company undertaking abuses against them. This is the case when a dominant firm owns an essential input and offers it under excessive conditions. Another example is the imposition of exclusivity or tying by a dominant supplier to small retail businesses. In both cases, the buying companies may fear that the lawsuit damages key commercial relationships.
Public enforcement is required even in cases where a dispute between two or more parties ends in a settlement. In principle, if the disputing parties achieve a satisfactory agreement, a trial is not necessary. However, that agreement does not necessarily comply with the law. It is possible that third parties such as consumers or other firms, not directly involved in the dispute, may be injured by the settlement's terms. For example, a dispute over exclusivity could be solved if the dominant firm transfers some of its rents to retailers in exchange for exclusive sales. While the agreement is satisfactory to the parties directly involved in the lawsuit, it is exclusionary for potential entrants. Another example is an interconnection conflict between telecommunications networks, where companies may agree to connect each other, but in a way that lessens overall competition due to the high interconnection fees.
III. THE CHILEAN INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION SYSTEM
The Chilean antitrust system, at the institutional level, has certain unique characteristics. Its most distinct feature is the separation at an institutional level between the functions of prosecution and resolution. 10 The FNE is the agency responsible for representing the public interest in competition matters. Among its functions are to act as an investigator and prosecutor of competition infringements, to provide technical reports to the Tribunal, and to supervise Tribunal compliance.
The Tribunal de Defensa de Libre Competencia or Tribunal for the Defense of Competition (TDLC), is the legal body that hears and decides first instance cases involving competition violations. The TDLC is a tribunal specializing in resolving competition disputes, formed by five members: three members are attorneys and the other two are economists. The decisions of the TDLC are appealable before the Supreme Court. The FNE has no authority to impose sanctions or to order companies, actions, or prohibitions in competition matters. Its institutional mission, to protect competition in the markets, is accomplished mainly through the initiation of proceedings, either accusatory or in the form of a consultation, before the TDLC.
This system has its origins in Chile's legalist traditions, where government actions that affect a company's autonomy must be resolved through the format of a trial. A similar structure is found in other areas of public action in Chile such as penal offences, where a National Prosecutor, who acts as an investigator and prosecutor, must defend his or her case before a judge from other state institutions. Third parties, such as companies or individuals, may also file lawsuits before the TDLC for infringements due to anticompetitive practices. Private agents have the same rights and privileges as the FNE during a trial. The FNE does not have a monopoly over the representation of the public interest. Parties indirectly affected but with a legitimate interest in a case, as stated by law, may initiate a lawsuit or submit a non-litigious consultation in defense of the public interest.
11 10 The Republic of South Africa has institutional structure similar to Chile where the roles of prosecution and sanction are separated. 11 For example, CONADECUS, the association of consumers, submitted a consultation to evaluate the merger between the airlines LAN and TAM, which triggered the review process by the Tribunal.
Private parties who are victims of abusive practices may request a preliminary or permanent injunction from the TDLC. Moreover, they may ask the Tribunal to impose monetary sanctions on the accused company. However, Chile's competition system does not confer plaintiffs the automatic right to receive monetary damages if their claims are accepted by the TDLC. To apply for monetary damages, the harmed party must start a special lawsuit for remedial damages, once the competition system has issued a decision on the merits of the case, and in a different court.
Trials for compensation due to anticompetitive harm are heard by civil courts and have their own procedures. As opposed to the United States, victims are not entitled to treble damages. Injured parties may opt for compensation as stated in the civil code in cases concerning the responsibility of commercial activities. The magnitude of possible compensation is equivalent to the monetary losses caused by the convicted company, without the inclusion of any augmentation factor to the harm suffered. 12 The Chilean system provides fewer incentives for private parties to file lawsuits than in those jurisdictions where victims can request treble damages, as in the case of the United States. In the best scenario, the affected party may only recover the direct losses caused by the illegal practice inflicted. 14 The database contains cases heard by the Tribunal since its inception in 2004. There are a total of 195 presented cases, 181 of which have concluded. As a specialized and unique legal body in the country, the Tribunal rules on all competition infringement lawsuits. As a result, the database has complete information on trials initiated and concluded at the national level.
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The possible roles of the FNE before the TDLC in litigious proceedings are the following: (1) plaintiff, (2) intervener, (3) independent claimant, (4) informer, and (5) abstainer. In the first case, the FNE is the entity accusing one or more companies of conducting anticompetitive practices; this action is designated as a "Complaint." In the second case, the prosecutor is party to a case previously initiated by a private party, supporting the position of the plaintiff. An independent claim is when the FNE intervenes in a case without necessarily taking the side of either party. The FNE acts as informer when it submits an opinion or report at the request of the TDLC concerning a lawsuit filed by a third party. Finally the prosecutor may eventually have no participation whatsoever. The FNE takes on a protagonist's role in the first two cases given that it becomes party to the case, filing charges against the defendants. Statistics show that 76 percent of cases submitted before the TDLC are initiated by private parties. The prosecutor takes on an active role supporting the plaintiff in 30 percent of the cases, initiating 24 percent and party to 6 percent. Despite the inexistence of an augmentation of damages, private parties have a protagonist's role in competition lawsuits in Chile. In the United States, with its treble damages system, the percentage of cases initiated by private parties is 90 percent, while in Germany it is approximately 50 percent.
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With respect to the type of anticompetitive abuse, litigations can involve abuse of dominant position or collusion. According to the statistics, the large majority of lawsuits, 87 percent, concern abuse of dominant position. In the cases of collusion, the FNE participates in 85 percent of those cases. In these accusations there is an asymmetrical pattern; in 79 percent of the cases the plaintiffs are exclusively private parties. A priori, these figures support the hypothesis of the greater value of public enforcement in cases of collusion than abuse of dominant position in the market, given the inherent problem of free-riding by injured parties for collusive acts. The size of the involved companies can also influence the decision of the public agency. As discussed in the previous part, small companies suffer from limited resources, which makes the prosecutor's participation all the more important. As no information is available regarding company size, either in sales or stock value, we will use the presence of the company in the Chilean stock exchange as a proxy. The implicit assumption is that companies listed on the stock exchange are generally larger in size than those that are not. The FNE is slightly more likely to be involved when the accused company is listed on the stock exchange. On the other hand, when the plaintiff is listed on the exchange, the lawsuit is less likely to involve the FNE. It is noteworthy that, in the latter case, the FNE was only involved as a party to a lawsuit initiated by a company.
The existence of a bias on the part of the prosecutor by refraining from participating in cases where the defendant is a public institution is plausible. The institution in question could be a ministry, regulatory agency, public company, or municipality. The conjecture is that the FNE refrains from taking part when the accused party is, like itself, a state-related entity. Data show that the prosecutor is party to 16 percent of those cases where the defendant is a public institution, compared with 34 percent where the defendant is private. Last, we will analyze if the type of market involved influences the interest of the public prosecutor. Table 5 lists lawsuits filed by industry according to FNE classification. At the same time, we indicate whether the market is considered sensitive or otherwise. We define a market as sensitive if its products are considered essential goods, or they are consumed by the large majority of the population. The markets that are classified as sensitive are: foodstuffs, education, pharmaceuticals, personal financial services, social security, retail services, healthcare, telecommunication, and transport.
The former Chilean antitrust law formally acknowledged the importance of the affected market. The penal sanction for collusion that existed at the time increased by one degree of severity if the offense occurred through the sale of essential items or services, specifically: foodstuffs, clothing, housing, medicine or healthcare. 17 It is common for the FNE to explicitly mention the sensitivity of the affected market in both its complaints against companies for anticompetitive actions and through its press releases.
18 Another way to classify a service as high impact is to evaluate statistics on complaints filed by clients or consumers before the National Service for the Protection of the Consumer. Aggregating the data and classifying sensitive and non-sensitive markets, we can observe that the prosecutor tends to focus on industries considered sensitive. The public agency acts as party to 39 percent of those cases involving sensitive markets, while it participates in only 22 percent of cases that affect the remaining markets.
19
So far, the bivariate analysis may present biases of omitted variables. For example, lower prosecutor participation in cases where the defendant is a public organization may be explained because these cases generally concern abuse of dominant of position, and not because the FNE refrained from acting against another state-related entity.
In Table 6 , we present a multivariate model of the factors behind the prosecutor's participation. Our dependent variable, Y, may take two values: Y=1 where the FNE participates in a case, and Y=0 if it does not. As the variable of interest is dichotomous, we estimate a nonlinear probability Probit model. For this purpose, we assume the existence of a latent variable, Y*, that represents the utility for the prosecutor to participate in a case. If the latent variable surpasses a threshold, the discrete variable Y takes the value of 1, and if it does not, it takes the value of 0. The latent variable depends on the aforementioned set of explicative variables (X): sensitive market, defendant is a public body, plaintiff is a company listed on the stock exchange, defendant is a company listed on the stock exchange, and the lawsuit is for collusion.
We assume that ε i is distributed as a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. Table 6 illustrates the results of the three Probit estimates. The first column uses the aforementioned explicative variables, save the variable related to the type of process (abuse of dominant position or collusion). The results indicate that it is more likely for the FNE to become party to a case when it involves a sensitive market (significant at 1 percent), the defendant is not a public entity (although significant only at 10 percent), and the plaintiff is not listed on the stock exchange (significant at 1 percent). No difference is found when the defending company is or is not listed on the stock exchange. If the case is related to a sensitive market, the prosecutor's participation increases to 17 percent when considering the remaining variables at their mean values.
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The size of the company filing the lawsuit is relevant. The FNE is more likely to participate when the case involves smaller companies, with a very significant effect. When the plaintiff is a company listed on the stock exchange, the likelihood that the FNE participates drops 28 percent. This result supports the hypothesis that the FNE concentrates its efforts on cases where the affected parties of anticompetitive practices are smaller companies of a smaller size with fewer resources and less expertise to face antitrust litigation. On the other hand, the size of the defending company has no relevance whatsoever in the FNE's decision to become party to or initiate a case.
Regression (2) rebuilds the exercise of regression (1), but restricts the sample to the 181 concluded cases. The results are qualitatively similar. Regression (3) includes the type of accusation filed. The results for all variables stay the same, except when the defendant is a private entity. This is explained because lawsuits filed against public institutions correspond to abuses of a dominant position-that is, cases where the FNE is less likely to participate. Finally, the type of accusation has a large impact on the presence of the FNE in a trial, either in initiating or in joining a case. In cases of collusion, the probability that the prosecutor will participate increases to 67 percent. 
V. EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
In this part, we measure the impact of the public agency's participation on the outcome of antitrust lawsuits. We begin by analyzing the result of resolved proceedings initiated before the Competition Tribunal since its inception in 2004. Lawsuits filed before the TDLC may resolve in four different ways: (1) decision, (2) settlement, (3) withdrawal, or (4) filing as record. In the event of a decision, the TDLC resolves with respect to the lawsuit filed, indicating whether or not the accused party is guilty, and issuing a conviction or acquittal and any imposed sanctions. In the case of settlement, both defendants and plaintiffs settle and withdraw the lawsuit. In the case of a withdrawal, the plaintiff terminates the lawsuit without reaching an agreement with the defendant. Finally, in the case of a filing on record, the TDLC closes the case due to plaintiff abandonment or because the case was not admitted by the Tribunal.
Since 2004, 181 lawsuits have been resolved before the Competition Tribunal. The FNE has participated in 52 of them, either through a complaint or by becoming party to the trial. As observed in Table 7 , 22 percent of the lawsuits filed ended either in withdrawal (5 percent) or were filed on record (17 percent). In cases where the prosecutor was involved, 4 percent were filed or withdrawn, while in those cases where the FNE was not involved, the percentage of filed or withdrawn cases was 29 percent.
Twelve percent of cases concluded in settlement. This percentage is similar in both those cases where the FNE participated (10 percent) or did not (12 percent). The proportion of trials ending in conciliation seems low compared to the values reported for countries such as the United States.
21 A potential explanation for this difference is that the settlement must be ratified by the Tribunal under the Chilean system. Finally, two-thirds of cases concluded with a decision issued by the TDLC. When the prosecutor participated in the trial, 87 percent of the cases ended with a decision, either a conviction or an acquittal. If the FNE did not participate, only 58 percent ended with a decision. By focusing on the type of decisions issued by the Tribunal, evidence shows that more than half of those cases where the prosecutor took part (56 percent) ended in a conviction. If the public agency did not participate, the conviction rate drops to 16 percent. The probability of obtaining a conviction, conditional to the trial concluding with a decision, was 26.7 percent if the plaintiffs are private parties. However, if the FNE is party to the case, the likelihood of condemnatory sentences rose to 64.4 percent.
The results in Table 7 are a first indication of the greater effectiveness the FNE has in obtaining convictions with respect to private parties. The minor percentage of cases that concluded with a decision without FNE participation can be explained by the ignorance of private parties in matters relating to competition-for example, what kinds of illegal actions are heard by the TDLC, or whether the reported conducts deserve a conviction. The difference may also reflect a strategic use of the cases by companies, as explained in Part II. A similar reasoning can explain the higher percentage of convictions achieved by the prosecutor vis-à-vis private parties.
To conduct a multivariate analysis of the FNE's effect on proceeding outcomes, we assume that lawsuits concluded as withdrawn, filed on record, or in acquittal, favor the defendant in detriment of the plaintiff's position. Regarding those trials that end in settlement, the database does not provide a way to distinguish between those settled in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, nor do we have information on settlements. As such, we do not label a conciliatory outcome as favorable to either party in a dispute. For thoroughness, we have restricted the results to those cases that concluded with a decision in some estimates.
The dependent variable-that is, a favorable result for the plaintiff-is dichotomous and equal to Y=1 in the case of a favorable decision for the plaintiff, and equal to Y=0 in the case of a favorable decision for the defendant, withdrawal, or filing on record. To estimate the impact of the FNE on the outcome of cases, we used a nonlinear probability Probit model. We assume that there is a latent variable Y*, representing the evidence and strength of the case submitted before the Tribunal. When the latent variable surpasses a threshold, the discrete variable Y takes the value of 1, and if it does not surpass said level, Y takes the value of 0. The latent variable depends on a combination of explicative factors, including our variable of interest: prosecutor participation. Table 8 reports our main results. Column (1) only controls for the FNE participation. The prosecutor's involvement significantly increases the probability of a favorable outcome for the plaintiff. The point estimate is 1.2 and is significant at 1 percent. This implies that involvement of the FNE increases the probability of a successful lawsuit by 40 percent. Column (2) controls for the type of case. This variable is equal to 1 when it is a case for collusion and 0 if it concerns abuse of dominant position. 22 The point estimated for the prosecutor's participation is not affected by this control.
23 Column (3) limits the sample to lawsuits with a Tribunal decision. The coefficient that accompanies the FNE's involvement does not change.
The evidence until now is non-conclusive with respect to the FNE's effect on the outcome of cases. As previously mentioned, these results may reflect a strategy for selection of cases and not the prosecutor's efficiency in founding and defending the case before the Tribunal. When deciding which cases to take, the public agency may prioritize those easier to win. In this scenario, our FNE participation variable not only captures the effect of the prosecutor on the outcome of cases, but also the strength of the initial convicting evidence for each case.
To mitigate this self-selection bias, we use an instrumental variable. We employ three instruments for the FNE´s participation: (1) whether the case involves a sensitive sector, (2) whether the defendant is a company listed on the stock exchange, and (3) whether the plaintiff is a company listed on the stock exchange. None of these variables should be correlated with the initial convicting evidence nor with the resolution adopted by the Tribunal, beyond the FNE's involvement.
Columns (4) through (9) present our probabilistic model with instrumental variables. By instrumentalizing the prosecutor's participation (as mentioned in the previous paragraph) in column (4), the FNE's impact on the probability of obtaining a conviction does not drop with respect to the non-instrumentalized estimate, column (1). On the contrary, the point estimate is greater, illustrating that the FNE does not select cases that are easier to win, in terms of evidence and arguments. The null hypothesis that all instruments are equal to zero is rejected at a 1 percent confidence level. Columns (5) and (6) present estimates using only two instruments at a time.
